The transformation of a socialist economy: lessons of German unification by Siebert, Horst et al.
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Siebert, Horst; Schmieding, Holger; Nunnenkamp, Peter
Working Paper
The transformation of a socialist
economy : lessons of German
unification
Kiel Working Papers, No. 469
Provided in cooperation with:
Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)
Suggested citation: Siebert, Horst; Schmieding, Holger; Nunnenkamp, Peter (1991) : The
transformation of a socialist economy : lessons of German unification, Kiel Working Papers, No.
469, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/573Kieler Arbeitspapiere
Kiel Working Papers
Kiel Working Paper No. 469
THE TRANSFORMATION OF A SOCIALIST ECONOMY





Institut fiir Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel
The Kiel Institute of World Economics
ISSN 0342-0787Kiel Institute of World Economics
Diisternbrooker Weg 120, D-2300 Kiel
Kiel Working Paper No. 469
THE TRANSFORMATION OF A SOCIALIST ECONOMY






The authors themselves, not the Kiel Institute of World Econo-
mics, are solely responsible for the contents and distribution of
Kiel Working Papers.
Since the series involves manuscripts in a preliminary form,
interested readers are requested to direct criticism and sugges-
tions directly to the authors and to clear any quotations with
them.- 1 -
I. Economic Transformation; The Principal Tasks
Last year's euphoria about democratization and economic liberali-
zation in Central and Eastern Europe has largely vanished.
Current news on the region is dominated by reports on inertial
transformation processes and the economic as well as social
adjustment burden. This does not only apply to countries like
Czechoslovakia, Hungary or Poland, but also to the former GDR
where an immediate second German "Wirtschaftswunder" was widely
expected until recently.
Considerable transition problems can hardly be avoided once fun-
damental economic reforms are implemented in countries characte-
rized by macroeconomic instability, pervasive government en-
croachment on investment and production, seriously deficient
incentive systems, the lack of appropriate institutions, and
infrastructural decay. But the degree and duration of transition
problems could be contained if economic reform programs were
credible and tailored to the specific starting conditions, and
serious inconsistencies among reform elements were avoided by an
economically sound timing and sequencing. Major areas of reform
are: institution building and privatization, macroeconomic
stabilization, and micro reforms directed towards internal de-
regulation and external liberalization.
- The institutional infrastructure relates to the rules to be
followed by economic agents, i.e. the economic constitution of
a country (for a more detailed presentation, see Siebert- 2 -
[1991b, pp. 6ff.]). Important elements of what the Freiburg
school calls the "Wirtschaftsordnung" include the legal system
(Privatrechtsordnung), most notably contract and company law, a
two-tier banking system with an independent central bank, the
delineation of government and private sector, as well as
clearly defined and enforceable property rights. The latter
provide the institutional device by which decisions can be
decentralized and microeconomic costs and benefits are related
to the specific producer.
Macroeconomic stabilization encompasses the elimination of a
monetary overhang as well as the reduction of unsustainable
fiscal and current account deficits. Monetary reform aims at
creating a stable and convertible currency which is mandatory
for the functioning of the price mechanism and efficient re-
source allocation. Excess domestic demand has to be removed by
expenditure reduction policies such as monetary and fiscal
restraint. Government expenditures must no longer be financed
by printing money, and an appropriate tax system has to be
developed. International competitiveness may be improved by
devaluation induced expenditure switching.
Reforms at the micro level relate to the various facets of the
soft budget constraint that characterizes the typical socialist
firm, e.g. its ability to achieve rents because of non-competi-
tive markets and to shift firm-specific costs and risks to the
government [Nunnenkamp and Schmieding, 1991]. A comprehensive
set of measures is required to tackle this problem. Most- 3 -
notably, price deregulation has to be accompanied by intensi-
fied competition via the break-up of monopolies and the aboli-
tion of the strict market segmentation. Competitive pressure
should be further increased by external liberalization. The
dismantling of trade barriers provides strong incentives for
enterprises to specialize according to their comparative
advantages; and capital account liberalization helps to attract
more investment funds. Additionally, factor market deregulation
is necessary for optimizing the allocation of both capital and
labour.
Third World experience suggests that structural adjustment pro-
grams are highly likely to fail if attempts to reform remain
piecemeal and inconsistent [Papageorgiou et al. , 1991]. Hence,
the question of timing and sequencing figures prominently in the
ongoing debate on economic transformation in Central and Eastern
Europe. It is now widely accepted that the institutional infra-
r
structure has to be established without delay. But controversies
persist on whether large-scale privatization should proceed
quickly because it provides the basis for other reform steps
[Lewandowski and Szomburg, 1989], or rather be postponed until
after macro stabilization has been achieved and micro reforms
have been implemented [Lipton and Sachs, 1990]. It is no longer
disputed that stabilization attempts are not credible unless they
are closely related to the principal micro reforms [e.g. Kornai,
1990]. Nevertheless, stabilization is considered to be of first
priority by some economists, especially in the case of signifi-
cant macroeconomic disequilibrium [e.g. Edwards, 1989]. Different- 4 -
views also exist on the phasing and degree of trade and capital
account liberalization.
It is thus not surprising that countries in Central and Eastern
Europe have followed different avenues of transition to a market
economy. Hungary has a fairly long history of piecemeal reforms,
the credibility of the recent more comprehensive attempt being at
stake presently. Poland is suffering from a considerable adjust-
ment crisis in the aftermath of its far-reaching stabilization
and liberalization program of early 1990. Until recently, Czecho-
slovakia focussed on developing the institutional infrastructure
required for a market economy, while the implementation of econo-
mic reforms was delayed. In sharp contrast, an unprecedented
shock approach has been applied in the former GDR. The above men-
tioned major reform elements were implemented in one stroke once
the state treaty had been concluded by the two German governments
in May 1990.
It is yet too early to conclusively judge the relative success or
failure of the different approaches towards economic transforma-
tion. Moreover, the specific starting conditions of the post-
communist economies render easy generalizations impossible.
Especially the peculiarities of the German case may seriously
limit the scope of lessons to be drawn for other reform-minded
countries. This is evident from the summary presentation of the
German Economic, Monetary and Social Union (GEMSU) in Section II
and the discussion of the advantageous conditions under which the
market economy is implemented in the ex-GDR. Nevertheless, strong- 5 -
similarities exist among the countries in transition as concerns
the basic problems of real adjustment, e.g. sectoral restructur-
ing, reorientation of trade, the behaviour of the socialist firm
and transformation of ownership, and improvement of infra-
structure (Section III). Similarities "also prevail with respect
to short-term transition costs; Section IV actually reveals a
relatively strong decline in economic activity in the case of the
ex-GDR. The causes of this slump are analysed in Section V. Sec-
tion VI concludes and summarizes the lessons to be drawn from the
German approach towards economic transformation.
II. Economic, Monetary and Social Union; The German "Experiment"
in a Favourable Environment
1. Major Elements
Notwithstanding strong evidence that transition costs can be
reduced by an appropriate timing and sequencing of reforms, the
policy course followed in reality by governments is not only
determined by economic rationality; it is rather the result of a
broader set of politico-economic considerations. This is clearly
the case for Germany which provides a rather unique experience in
the sense that, from the very beginning, the political decision
makers viewed the economic integration of the two Germanies as
part and parcel of political unification. Arguably, economic
decisions have even been instrumental in achieving the principal
aim of making the process towards unification irreversible [Hoff-
mann, 1991]. It can be hypothesized that, because of such broadly- 6 -
defined politico-economic rationality, the transition costs in
terms of production losses and employment problems are much more
pronounced than would have been the case if pure economic logic
had prevailed.
This reasoning refers to the surprise move in February 1990 of
the West German chancellor towards a quick currency union in the
first place. In the aftermath of the March 1990 elections in the
GDR, the terms of the German Economic, Monetary and Social Union
(GEMSU) were negotiated, the corresponding state treaty was con-
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eluded in May, and GEMSU became effective on July 1, 1990. The
sweeping economic integration of the two Germanies subjected the
centrally planned GDR economy to an unprecedented shock. Three
months prior to unification, the DMark (DM) became the sole legal
tender, replacing the East German Mark (M) . The conversion rate
of M 1 : DM 1 applied to recurrent payments, most notably wages,
was heavily debated among economists; while politicians argued
that a more realistic rate, which might have helped further seg-
ments of the GDR's industry to achieve international competitive-
ness, would have resulted in socially unacceptable wage gaps
between East and West Germany and fuelled westward migration. By
contrast, a conversion rate of M 2 : DM 1 applied to domestic
financial assets and liabilities, except savings of GDR residents
of M 2000 - 6000 per capita (depending on age) which were conver-
For an overview on the background and plans for reform in the
GDR, see Mayer and Thumann [1990],
2
Subsequently, the drive for political union accelerated.
According to the Unity Treaty, the GDR became part of the
Federal Republic of Germany on October 3, 1990.- 7 -
ted at the preferential M 1 : DM 1 rate. At the same time, the
GDR government lost its monetary autonomy. Given the Bundesbank's
traditional anti-inflationary stance, monetary destabilization
was unlikely to become a major problem in the aftermath of the
currency union [see also Lipschitz, 1990, pp. 6 and 16]. With the
introduction of the DMark, East Germany participates in the bene-
fits of a fully convertible currency.
Economic and social integration was achieved by the wholesale
adoption by the GDR of West Germany's concept of "social market
economy" with only few exceptions. According to the state
treaty, central planning and pervasive state interference into
the GDR economy were abolished and replaced by the principles of
private property, competition, free prices, as well as free move-
ment of labour, capital, goods and services. Microeconomic de-
regulation was even more embracing than in West Germany in 1948
[for details, see Schmieding, 1991a]: Apart from rents and public
utilities all price controls were lifted, and wage determination
was left to collective bargaining of employers and labour unions.
Moreover, sweeping liberalization took place at the external
front. The GDR became fully integrated into the European Communi-
ty and world capital markets. The isolation of the economy from
international competition ended abruptly.
Among institutional reforms, the introduction of a market-based
banking system in the GDR (with unrestricted capital flows,
Among the exceptions, the different treatment of short-time
work is noteworthy.- 8 -
freely determined interest rates, and full access to world capi-
tal markets) figures prominently. The reorganization of existing
firms, i.e. demonopolization of the so-called "Kombinate", effi-
ciency enhancement, and privatization, constitutes another cruci-
al prerequisite to help real adjustment. Demonopolization was at
least partly achieved by splitting up 316 "Kombinate" into 8000
legally independent firms, which were placed in a Trust Fund
(Treuhandanstalt). The mandate given to the Trust Fund included
the liquidation of non-viable firms, the restructuring of poten-
tially viable enterprises, and privatization where possible. It
was decided that, in principle, companies expropriated after
1949 (and before 1945), as well as expropriated land and real
estate, would be returned to the previous owners. Compensation
would be paid, however, if restitution was not feasible or con-
stituted a major deterrent to private investment.
2. East Germany's Advantages
Until German unification, the East German economy was no special
case in Central and Eastern Europe. The economic order as well as
the political system were of the standard Soviet type. The GDR
was roughly comparable to the Czech lands (Bohemia and Moravia)
in terms of most socio-economic indicators, notably living stan-
dards, the level of economic development, industrial traditions,
the state of the infrastructure, and the extent of environmental
damages. With the collapse of communism, however, East Germany
In effect, the major West German commercial banks have played
an important role in the GDR's banking system since July 1990.- 9 -
became a place apart; it had the opportunity to make use of one
fundamental advantage: West Germany. The ex-GDR is rather small
in comparison to West Germany with its well established and ad-
vanced market economy (26 per cent in terms of population, 8-10
per cent in terms of GDP). Hence, regardless of the details of
the policies adopted, German unification implied per se that the
pains of political and economic transformation were to become
mere regional problems of a much larger economic unit. United
Germany's overall stability would be only marginally affected by
whatever difficulties the switch to a market economy in the
eastern part would entail.
By virtue of German unification, East Germany could import the
political stability and legitimacy of the Federal Republic. In a
similar vein, GEMSU meant that the regime switch in East Germany
was absolutely credible and definitely irreversible. Furthermore,
East Germans gained access to the highly developed social securi-
ty system of the West so that real adjustment costs could be
automatically cushioned by public transfers. These factors are
not only advantages per se; they imply a far greater freedom to
conduct first-best economic policies than in all other post-
communist countries. In Hungary, Poland, the CSFR and beyond, the
short-term repercussions of potentially painful economic policies
on the fragile political system have to be one of the major con-
cerns of the reformers. As the March 18 elections in East Germany
had revealed overwhelming support for rapid political and econo-
mic unification, there was much less need for an arduous process
of internal consensus building than elsewhere. Decisions could be- 10 -
taken swiftly and implemented instantaneously.
In particular, the East German advantages relate to the institu-
tional infrastructure as well as to macroeconomic policies and
the prospects for real economic adjustment. The institutional
infrastructure of a market economy has to be built from scratch
in other post-communist countries. East Germany simply adopted
the well-established laws and regulations of West Germany, which
did not even need to be translated. Together with the establish-
ment of the West German judicial system in the East, this implied
that the fundamental institution of capitalism, i.e. private
property rights, would be fully and lastingly respected. Hence,
uncertainty of economic agents was reduced to the question whe-
ther previously expropriated property would be restituted. Many
West German institutions extended their reach to East Germany,
other institutions in the East could be remodelled in the Western
image. Some transfers of human capital and administrative staff
as well as other kinds of technical assistance were supposed to
facilitate the implementation of the institutional reforms and
the application of the new rulebook. The cultural proximity to
West Germany and the dense net of contacts is likely to make it
easier for East Germans to get used to the rules of the market
quickly. It can even be argued that the extension of the West
German unions to East Germany presented at least an opportunity
for a rational wage bargaining in the East. Unlike the old or new
unions in post-communist Europe, the West German unions are
acquainted with a market economy and familiar with the need for a
rough balance between wages and labour productivity.- 11 -
The macroeconomic problems of the late GDR were de facto solved
with GEMSU. With the DMark replacing the East German Mark, the
accumulated East German monetary overhang was spread over a much
larger currency area. Hence, the threat of a rising price level
after price liberalization was diminished; the future East
German inflation rate is given by the'rate of price increases for
tradables in united Germany and the relative rise in prices for
East German non-tradables. East German fiscal problems were
greatly eased by unification. Even to the extent that budget
deficits of the new "Lander" will not be directly financed by
Western transfers, East German public authorities are likely to
benefit from the creditworthiness of the West, at least as long
as the lenders can confidently assume that these credits are
implicitly guaranteed by the federal government. Furthermore, the
problem of the GDR's external debt de facto vanished for East
Germany by courtesy of unification.
Even with respect to the process of real economic adjustment,
East Germany's starting conditions appeared to be favourable. As
With the currency union, the DMark money supply (M3) increased
by 14.5 per cent [Deutsche Bundesbank, 1990, p. 4*] while the
production potential of the DMark currency area was enlarged by
roughly 8 per cent. The difference constitutes a potential for
overall German inflation, albeit a manageable one. The Bundes-
bank may well succeed in neutralizing this unwarranted surge in
the money supply by an appropriately restrictive monetary poli-
cy. Furthermore, the very fact that German unification has led
to an exceptionally severe adjustment crisis may well induce
East Germans to keep involuntarily accumulated money balances
as voluntary savings for the time being.
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The latter will be a by-product of rent liberalization in the
first place; and over the course of catching up with the West,
market prices for non-tradables in the East will increase rela-
tive to those of tradables.- 12 -
far as adjustment at the micro level is concerned, the critical
question is whether firms can be privatized soon and whether
managers of state firms do - or can be made to - react to market
signals in a textbook manner and to care about long-run profit-
ability almost as if they were controlled by private owners.
Privatization should be much easier 'in the ex-GDR than elsewhere
in Central and Eastern Europe due to political stability, gene-
rous social security provisions, unrestricted access to the world
capital market, a fully convertible currency, and the transfer of
administrative know how; and by virtue of German unification, the
pool of talents from which new managers for private enterprises
and state firms can be drawn is much broader. Also with regard to
firms that remain in the hand of the state for the time being,
there was reason to expect a comparatively flexible and effici-
ency-oriented reaction to market signals (for the strategic
choices open to managers of state firms after the demise of cen-
tral planning, see the subsequent section): Because of the clear
irreversibility of the regime switch in East Germany and the
political stability which may promise to make a rational discus-
sion about the future for members of the old nomenclatura easier
than elsewhere in post-communist Europe, the incentives to adopt
an efficiency-oriented adjustment strategy appear to be compara-
tively strong for East German managers.
All in all, it is hardly to be disputed that the GEMSU has laid
the ground for economic recovery of the ex-GDR in the longer run.
Moreover, it has helped to ease the social burden of adjustment.
At the same time, however, East Germany suffers from more or less- 13 -
common problems of post-communist economies as far as real
adjustment in the short run is concerned, and the particulars of
the GEMSU may even have caused an extraordinarily severe transi-
tion crisis, as will be discussed in the subsequent sections.
Ill. Basic Similarities; Problems of Real Adjustment
The clear advantages the ex-GDR has in managing economic trans-
formation, relative to other reform-minded countries, led to
overly optimistic scenarios with regard to short-run economic
recovery. Also, the comparatively favourable endowment with
skilled labour, though constituting a major asset in the longer
run, made many observers underrate the serious obstacles to real
adjustment in the transition period. As concerns some critical
adjustment problems, the ex-GDR reveals strong similarities with
its neighbours in Central and Eastern Europe.
First, the physical and administrative infrastructure suffers
from serious decay. Social overhead capital in transportation and
communication is particularly deficient. For example, 45 per cent
of the equipment in postal and communication services is older
than 20 years [Institut fur Internationale Politik und Wirt-
schaft, 1990]. The public administration in the former GDR lacks
experience in dealing with markets and the institutional frame-
work of a market economy. Recording of land titles and the li-
censing procedure for firms provide cases in point. A similar
mismatch between the sweeping establishment of the institutional- 14 -
infrastructure and the much more difficult task to develop the
human skills required to efficiently handle the system is to be
observed in the juridical sphere.
Second, the sectoral structure of the GDR economy is heavily
distorted. It is biased towards agriculture and - to a lesser
extent - manufacturing, and against non-government services [for
details, see Siebert, 1990, p. 35]. In 1989, 47.2 per cent of
total GDR employment was in agriculture, energy and mining, and
manufacturing; the respective share amounted to only 37 per cent
in West Germany. Employment in manufacturing was reduced by 13
per cent during the 1970-1989 period in West Germany, while it
expanded by 10 per cent in the GDR. Moreover, GDR employment is
heavily concentrated in sunset sectors and branches that have
been declining rapidly in the West.
Third, integration into the international division of labour is
significantly below world standards. The share of GDR exports in
GNP is estimated at 25 per cent, while the respective share
amounts to 40-50 per cent for Western economies of a comparable
size. As a result of the intra-bloc specialization philosophy of
the CMEA, more than 60 per cent of GDR exports were directed to
these less demanding markets (West Germany: less than 5 per
cent). The incentives to strive for quality improvement, technol-
ogical progress, and better marketing were thus largely eroded.
Taken together, agriculture, forestry and fishing, mining,
clothing, and textiles accounted for 16.2 per cent of the GDR
labour force, as opposed to merely 6.4 per cent in West Germa-
ny.- 15 -
CMEA trade flows were determined by political bargaining so that
the pattern of specialization did not (necessarily) reflect the
comparative advantages of the GDR [Stehn and Schmieding, 1990].
Fourth, the capital stock is technologically outdated, physically
run down, and economically and ecologically obsolete to a large
extent. In the ex-GDR, only about one quarter of industrial
equipment has been installed in the last five years (West Germa-
ny: 39 per cent); more than half is older than 10 years (West
Germany: 30 per cent) and 21 per cent is even older than 20 years
[Institut fur Internationale Politik und Wirtschaft, 1990].
Most of the afore mentioned deficiencies that characterize the
current situation in the ex-GDR, and Central and East European
countries in general, can be traced back to the inherent flaws of
a Soviet-type economic system and the typical behaviour of the
socialist firm [Siebert, 1991a]. The socialist firm has been
inefficient for a number of reasons: It was steered by quantity
signals and protected from competition by central planning, mar-
ket segmentation and import barriers. In factor and goods mar-
kets, prices were either non-existent (capital; environment) or
determined through the central planning process. Most important-
ly, efficiency was eroded by the soft budget constraint, i.e. the
socialist firm's access to subsidies and related privilegies.
The transition to a market economy represents an unexpected shock
to the socialist firm. This shock was particularly pronounced in
the case of the GDR with all prices freed, complete integration- 16 -
into international trade and world capital markets, the conver-
sion rate of M 1 : DM 1 for current payments, and the non-exis-
tence of the exchange, rate as a shock absorber. Such a dramatic
change clearly reveals the inefficiency of the socialist firm. As
a result, output is bound to fall. While transition problems
cannot be avoided, their severity critically depends on the reac-
tions of managers to the reform program. Under the pressure of
declining traditional demand, private enterprises would seek new
markets, cut costs, launch new products, and look for alternative
channels of distribution. But this does not necessarily happen in
post-communist economies when privatization is lagging behind or
has not even been started [Winiecki, 1990, p. 773].
After the demise of central planning, rational self-interested
managers of firms that are still in the hand of the state have a
choice of three strategies (which are not always mutually ex-
clusive) [Schmieding, 1991b]:
(1) Wait and see: Given their experience with piecemeal reform
efforts in the past, managers might expect that also present
reform programs will be diluted or completely abandoned once
transition problems emerge. Their major interest then is to keep
their job and avoid painful decisions. They will pin their hopes
on subsidies and use their time to clamour for such subsidies
from the state. This would probably result in the most unfavour-
able outcome envisaged by adjustment theory, i.e. significant
cuts in output with maintaining the overstaffing of firms. While
the likelihood of reform reversal appears to be extremely low in- 17 -
the German case, readily available subsidies may still make this
option attractive for managers.
(2) End games: Managers expecting that policy reforms will be
sustained and being afraid that they will lose their job in the
near future anyhow, have a particularly strong incentive to use
their remaining time to enrich themselves at the expense of the
state-owned firm. This may be achieved via ordinary theft or via
some more sophisticated variants of "spontaneous privatization".
In this way, the firm's ability to adjust may be further eroded
since the funds required for maintaining and modernizing its
capital stock are diverted away. On the other hand, some variants
of "spontaneous privatization" - disregarding the unpleasant
distributional implications - may lead to the emergence of effi-
ciently run private firms.
(3) Reputation building: Managers may run the firm as if it were
privately owned already, at least within the confines in which
they have to operate, if a future career in the management of a
2
private firm is considered likely. They may then try their best
to establish their credentials via private-sector like adjustment
efforts. Only this strategy would imply an economically efficient
behaviour.
Various opportunities exist in this respect. For example, man-
agers of state-owned firms have created private enterprises
while still in office. They have then transferred part of the
state-owned firm's assets to their own enterprise by estab-
lishing close links between both units and specifying contract
terms at the expense of the state-owned firm still managed by
them [Schmieding and Koop, 1991, p. 8].
2
Actually, some adjustment of this sort has been observed, e.g.
in the case of Poland [Jorgensen, et al., 1990].- 18 -
The built-in inefficiency of the socialist firm and the ambiguous
incentives of managers suggest that privatization of existing
firms should not be unduly delayed, in order to help real adjust-
ment in the transition period. Private ownership is an important
prerequisite to ensure that decisions in the firms are dominated
by economic considerations, managers are controlled by the capi-
tal market, capital is allocated efficiently, and structural
change is initiated [Siebert, 1991a; 1991b; 1991c; Collier and
Siebert, 1991]. A major issue is by which institutional arrange-
ment privatization can be achieved [Schmieding and Koop, 1991].
The options available differ especially with respect to the time
they require: Providing access to the stock market is fairly time
consuming in post-communist economies and subject to many precon-
ditions even if firms were viable. By contrast, informal selling
can proceed without delay, but runs the risk of "too low" selling
prices with only one party on the buyer's side. The disadvantages
of both extremes can be avoided by a formal bidding process which
guarantees competition among potential buyers, quick injection of
fresh capital and provision of new management. A voucher system
represents another alternative [Lewandowski and Szomburg, 1989].
Vouchers defining titles to all state-owned enterprises would be
handed out to the population and, in a later stage, exchanged
against shares of specific firms.
The conditions for privatization differ among reform-minded coun-
tries in Central and Eastern Europe. In the German case, monetary
stabilization has already been achieved, and the risk of policy
reversal and exchange rate risk is largely absent. The potential- 19 -
to attract new private capital is relatively large. This poten-
tial should be tapped quickly given that the opportunity costs of
delayed privatization are particularly high in the German case:
Any prolonged divergence in production and employment levels be-
tween East and West Germany would necessitate additional official
transfers and may lead to an inefficient and costly structural
policy.
Under the German conditions, the political and economic arguments
in favour of distributing the privatization receipts directly and
equally among the population are of less relevance than in other
Central and East European countries. Particularly the voucher
system is not to be recommended. In the case of widely spread
shares, an effective monitoring of managers by the shareholders
is hardly possible so that the incentives of the former to en-
hance the firm's efficiency remain weak [Hinds, 1990, p. 113].
Hence, the approach of the Treuhand, acting as a privatization
agency, to identify potential buyers and to initiate a bidding
process is more promising. The process of privatization may be
further accelerated if firms and potential buyers were given the
right to propose a sale and, thus, initiate an open bidding pro-
cess themselves. In addition, a semi-stock market with less for-
mal stock exchange admission regulations may be established to
allow economically viable East German firms easier access to the
Some particulars must be laid down in the contract that pro-
vides the basis for the bidding process, most notably the allo-
cation of environmental vintage damages, the treatment of old
debt and other liabilities, and - possibly - investment and
employment guarantees.- 20 -
i
capital market, with suppliers of capital assuming greater risk.
By establishing a privatization agency, it is not ruled out that
governments attempt to confuse privatization with structural
policy. The temptation to smoothen the adjustment for individual
firms and reduce short-term unemployment problems by subsidizing
old lines of production is evident in the German case. The objec-
tive to improve the efficiency of firms before they are pri-
vatized is explicitly stated in the law on the privatization and
reorganization of state-owned property (Treuhandgesetz); due to
political pressure, this objective is likely to gain further
importance in the future. However, it is mandatory that Treuhand
concentrates on privatization, simply because it does not have
reliable information on the economic viability of the 8000 firms
in its portfolio. Enterprises not taken over by private owners
even after inherited debt and environmental damages have been
cleared by the government must be closed down, instead of wasting
the receipts from privatization by subsidizing non-viable firms.
The living standard of the affected people should be protected by
social rather than structural policy, since the former does not
interfere with an efficient allocation of capital.
Apart from privatizing existing firms, the creation of new firms
is crucially important to alleviate the transition crisis, con-
tain unemployment problems, and promote the restructuring of the
economy. Hence, market entry barriers must be abolished, location
A disadvantage of this option might be that it makes it easier
for the old management to stay in power.- 21 -
space supplied, and finance made available especially for smaller
firms.
The destruction of property rights during the communist rule
constitutes the most serious hindrance to privatization and in-
vestment in new firms. In some East European countries, especi-
ally the Soviet Union, it has still to be clarified to what
extent individual property rights will be reinstated as an insti-
tutional device in the transition towards a market economy. In
this fundamental sense, property rights have already been estab-
lished in the ex-GDR. Nevertheless, uncertainty with respect to
ownership continues.
This appears to be largely due to the principal decision by the
two German governments in 1990 to reinstitute the previous owners
who were expropriated in the GDR since 1949 [see also Siebert,
1991a, pp. 13ff.]. Previous owners will be compensated, however,
if reinstitution is not feasible because expropriated property
was used for other than its original purpose, e.g. in construc-
2
tion, infrastructure or industrial activities. Remaining ambigu-
ity with respect to reinstitution or compensation as well as
administrative bottlenecks have rendered it extremely difficult
to overcome ownership uncertainty: First, property titles have
not been documented adequately for forty years in the GDR.
In the meanwhile, about one million applications for reinstitu-
tion from previous owners are under consideration, about 10 000
of which relating to medium and small-sized firms.
It was also decided that expropriations carried out during the
time of the Soviet military government (1945-1949) would not be
reversed. A decision by the constitutional court is pending on
this issue, however.- 22 -
Second, previous owners are inclined to demand reinstitution
instead of compensation and to go to the courts when the market
value of the expropriated property exceeds the offered financial
compensation; the transition process may be seriously delayed
while waiting for the final court decision which may take several
years. Third, in many instances, a large number of claims relates
to one particular firm which has acquired various pieces of pro-
perty over the last four decades. Currently (March 1991), the
sale of a firm is actually blocked in the ex-GDR in the case of
claims on part of its assets by previous owners. As a conse-
quence, Treuhand cannot proceed with privatization.
Ownership uncertainty has to be removed as far and as quickly as
possible in order to contain the transition crisis. Most im-
portantly, a clear preference should be given to financial com-
pensation of previous owners, especially when reinstitution
undermines productive operations by economically viable units. As
a minimum, Treuhand should be authorized to provide potential
investors with user rights on assets for which claims by previous
owners are unsettled. Long-term leasing agreements may reduce the
investor's risk, while the time consuming settlement of compensa-
tion demands would be handled by Treuhand. In the remaining ca-
ses, the process of reinstitution must be accelerated. This may
be achieved if previous owners were preliminarily installed in
their ownership rights until a final court decision is reached.
In addition, administrative capacities have to be improved, e.g.
These problems are dealt with in the recent law on unsettled
property issues which has passed cabinet on February 6, 1991.- 23 -
by delegating administrative staff from the old to the new "Lan-
der", to set up appropriate title records and manage the li-
censing procedures for new firms.
IV. Economic Performance of East Germany in Comparative
Perspective
Two conclusions emerge from the above discussion: First, major
adjustment problems cannot be avoided in the transition from a
centrally planned towards a market economy. Second, the temporary
decline in output and employment is likely to depend on the se-
verity of the initial distortions, the speed and methods of pri-
vatization, and the opportunities for new firms to start opera-
tions. The principal problems of real adjustment in the ex-GDR
reveal strong similarities with other Central and East European
countries. It is thus not surprising that also East Germany
suffers from a severe transition crisis.
The current economic malaise in the ex-GDR is clearly reflected
in the data (Table 1), although statistical measurement is loaded
with various conceptual difficulties in the case of economies
undergoing fundamental changes in the economic regime:
- Open unemployment rose significantly during 1990. Moreover,
unemployment is seriously underestimated by the ratio of 6.1
For example, indices of production refer to obsolete price
weights, and statistics on the pre-reform era are likely to be
deliberately beautified.- 24 -
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Source: Deutsches Institut fUr Wirtschaftsforschung [1991].- 25 -
per cent reported for the fourth quarter of 1990. This is be-
cause the more generous application of regulations on short-
time work in the ex-GDR (probably at least until end-1991)
induced many firms not to lay off the workforce; short-time
work, with working hours frequently reduced down to zero, be-
came a common feature. Table Al reveals that unemployment would
be more than twice as high as the officially recorded unemploy-
ment ratio if the number of short-time workers, weighted by the
proportion of idle working time, were added.
Apparently, the recent boom in firm registrations, amounting to
about 30 000 per month in the second half of 1990 (Table A2),
had at best a limited impact on labour markets, given signifi-
cantly declining employment figures and the low and stagnant
number of vacancies. To a large extent, the registration num-
bers refer to the re-registration of existing firms rather than
to the uprise of new ones; and most of the new firms are very
small and have not yet started operations. Interestingly, also
the number of cancelled registrations increased from 6.4 per
cent of total registrations in July 1990 to 16.2 per cent in
November 1990. «
The development of gross wages was not at all related to the
unfavourable employment situation, nor to the level and trend
of labour productivity. Labour productivity in the GDR was
estimated at one third (or even less) relative to West German
standards [Siebert and Schmieding, 1990]. A further decline is
reported for the third quarter of 1990; subsequently producti-- 26 -
vity recovered to the 1989 level (Table 1). In sharp contrast,
nominal wages increased significantly after the GEMSU had been
concluded; within six months, wages soared by 30 per cent.
While investment fell, private and government consumption was
decoupled almost completely from GDR production [ see also
Gabrisch et al., 1990, pp. 16f£.]. Comparing the fourth quar-
ters of 1989 and 1990, consumption was higher by 3-8 per cent
with GDP down by more than 30 per cent and imports doubled
(Table 1).
2
The dramatic fall of production was most pronounced in industry
which experienced a slump of about 50 per cent in the third
against the second quarter of 1990. According to Table A3, all
major industries suffered from a drastic decline in production
immediately after the GEMSU. The slight improvement observed in
September, October and November may be due to "better organized
support of the Treuhandanstalt" [ibid, p. 17]. The December
figure indeed indicates that industrial production has not yet
touched bottom. Especially the expiration of the previous con-
tracts for exports to CMEA countries is likely to result in a
further decrease of industrial production.
To some extent, this productivity increase simply mirrors
higher wage costs in the government sector which is directly
financed by Western transfers.
2
Moreover, the nominal consumption figures significantly under-
state the substantial rise in real living standards. They do
not capture the effect that sub-standard East German tradables
were largely replaced by cheaper and qualitatively superior
Western products.- 27 -
Notwithstanding subsidies from the West of considerable magni-
tude, the transition crisis in the former GDR is of unprecedented
severity by international standards (Table 2). Comparing 1990
with 1989, the decline in industrial production and GDP was more
than three times the decline observed for the average of Central
and East European countries. Moreover, the annual change for East
Germany tells only part of the story because the transition shock
is still blurred by the pre-reform era until mid-1990. The
awkward situation of the ex-GDR is not at all surprising relative
to countries such as Czechoslovakia or the Soviet Union where
comprehensive economic reforms have been delayed and the transi-
tion crisis is still lying ahead. Remarkably, however, the econo-
mic downfall after the GEMSU was even much more pronounced than
in Poland, where industrial production in the state sector de-
clined by about 25 per cent in the aftermath of the far-reaching
stabilization and liberalization program launched in early 1990
Table 2 - Industrial Production in Central and East European
Countries in 1990 (annual change against corre-
sponding period in 1989 in per cent)






















































Source: Gabrisch et al. [1990].- 28 -
(against minus 50 per cent after the GEMSU). This suggests that
the above mentioned advantages of the ex-GDR in managing economic
transformation were outweighed, at least in the short run, by
GDR-specific transition problems and policy failures.
V. Causes of the East German Slump
From the comparison with Poland, interesting insights may be
gained on the causes of the particularly strong decline in output
in East Germany. For both countries, some decrease in output was
to be expected for two reasons: First, some of the goods produced
under socialist conditions (notably many investment goods) had no
positive economic value; unless generous subsidies were paid to
maintain this absurdity, the switch to a market economy would
give rise to welfare-enhancing cuts in value-distracting produc-
tion activities. Second, the regime switch induces a transition
crisis which becomes evident in a temporary drop in production.
In other respects, East Germany and Poland differed markedly: On
the one hand, Poland had to eradicate hyperinflation at the be-
ginning of 1990, while East Germany in mid-1990 imported the
macroeconomic stability of the Federal Republic. As drastic sta-
bilization programs tend to go along with a deep recession, the
slump in production was likely to be more severe in Poland. On
the other hand, the sweeping external liberalization in East
Germany was likely to make the crisis there more front-loaded.
Balancing these two factors, East Germany does not appear to be
at a disadvantage.- 29 -
However, what turns the balance against East Germany is that
external liberalization was accompanied by a significant rise in
local production costs, most notably due to the terms at which
the DMark was introduced on July 1. Based on what is admittedly
only an imperfect yardstick - the measured competitiveness of
East German exports to the West - the former East German Mark was
worth only 23 West German Pfennigs. Hence, the conversion rate
of M 1 : DM 1 for current payments resulted in a dramatic over-
valuation of East German economic output, which became even more
pronounced with soaring nominal wages during the course of 1990.
The ensuing East German economic crisis was not surprising, given
that the region has undergone a sharp increase in production
costs and full competitive exposure to world markets at the same
time. By contrast, Poland at the beginning of 1990 devalued the
Zloty to a realistic rate close to the black market rate and has
2
since enjoyed an export boom.
Politicians and even economists have frequently argued that a
conversion rate of M 1 : DM 1 for current payments including
wages was inevitable: With all legal and institutional barriers
to labour mobility being removed, an East German wage level that
was in line with the low level of labour productivity in the
tradable goods sector would have caused an unwanted surge in
The foreign currency coefficient which indicates the value of
domestic inputs in East German Mark needed to earn one DMark in
exports stood at 4.4 in 1989.
2
At the end of 1990, those East German workers who were still
fully employed earned roughly 6-8 times more than their Czecho-
slovak and Polish counterparts.
3
A conversion rate of M 2 : DM 1 had been proposed by Schmieding
[1990] and - in a marginally modified form - by the Deutsche
Bundesbank.- 30 -
migration to the West. This argument may be challenged for a
variety of reasons:
- Economically, migration of workers to locations of higher pro-
ductivity is not necessarily damaging. There may be externali-
ties of migration which harm the people in the emigration
region. But unlike cross-border migration of labour, intra-
German migration gives rise not only to higher individual wel-
fare of migrants, but also to an increase of united Germany's
GNP and, hence, to higher tax revenues that may benefit the
region of origin. These extra tax receipts can be utilized to
improve the investment environment in East Germany, e.g. via a
more rapid build-up of the physical and institutional infra-
structure. Consequently, the economic case for artificially
slowing down migration is not as strong as frequently suggested
[see also Mayer, 1990b].
- The adverse effects of wage hikes across the board, most notab-
ly in terms of higher unemployment and the ensuing uncertainty
about the economic future of the region, may well be a stronger
incentive for emigration than wage differentials; whereas
productivity-oriented wage levels would have provided ample
scope for the differentiation of wages needed to tailor them to
the pattern of labour demand. Migration to the West has actu-
ally increased in the aftermath of the currency union.
- Politically, there may be sound arguments for generous trans-
fers to allow East German citizens to enjoy a standard of- 31 -
living far greater than warranted by the value of their labour
productivity. Exaggerated wage levels, and social transfers to
cushion the unfavourable employment consequences, however, are
an inefficient means to persuade East Germans to stay put. In
this way, the profitability of production is reduced, with the
result of an unnecessarily sharp decline in output and locally
generated income. With more realistic .wages and a smaller drop
in domestic production, higher levels of both living standards
and investment could have been attained in the East with a
given amount of transfers from the West.
Principally, the conversion rate sets only the initial wage rate,
while equilibrium wages can be attained in subsequent wage bar-
gaining [Schinasi et al., 1990]. However, nominal wages in the
ex-GDR proved to be inflexible downwards. Indeed, fostered by the
political promise to narrow the gap in living standards between
the two parts of Germany, East German wages have risen sharply
after the currency union while production collapsed at the same
time. While Poland had levied punitive taxes on wage increases
exceeding the rate of inflation (or a certain percentage of price
level increases), there were no constraints on collective bar-
gaining agreements in the ex-GDR. Note that the East German wage
hikes can hardly be interpreted as the result of a market-deter-
mined process of wage setting: Wage increases were in most cases
granted by managers of state firms who have no strong incentive
to care for the long-term profitability of their firm. Further-
more, both employers and employees had good reason to assume that
the firms would operate under a soft budget constraint so that- 32 -
excessive cost increases would be compensated by additional sub-
sidies [for a similar reasoning, see Lipschitz, 1990, p. 16].
As it turned out, -the political promise to quickly narrow gaps in
living standards and the failure to devise ways of doing so with-
out causing a slump in East German production have wiped out the
chances of profitable production in most existing plants on the
basis of current physical and institutional infrastructure. Al-
though it continues to exist in physical terms, much industrial
capacity has been made economically obsolete. The inevitable cuts
in production automatically reduce tax revenues. And most locally
produced goods have simply disappeared from East German shelves
because they no longer command a price advantage over qualita-
tively superior Western imports.
Because of the cost explosion, investments to improve the exis-
ting plants can hardly succeed to quickly attain the high level
of productivity that corresponds to the inflated wage level.
Hence, modernization of the East German economy has to take place
via the lengthy and costly route of rebuilding the major part of
production capacity almost from scratch [Schmieding, 1991a].
Somewhat cynically, one may even argue that the behaviour of
trade unions in East Germany is quite rational from an East
German perspective regardless of the nature of the budget con-
straint for individual firms and the resulting drop in employ-
ment: Unions trying to maximize the sum of wages and unemploy-
ment benefits in East Germany have an incentive to push for
West German wage levels, regardless of the local level of
productivity, as the overall costs of unemployment are shifted
onto non-residents, i.e. the West German taxpayer, and as East
German unemployment benefits themselves rise with local wage
levels.- 33 -
There seems to be less need for going this way in Poland. Un-
fortunately, this already daunting task is greatly complicated by
another feature of German economic unification: Almost all of the
intricate complexities of West German laws and regulations have
been introduced in East Germany. These administrative hurdles to
investment may be bearable in the advanced West, where adminis-
trators have learned to cope with these rules over the course of
time. Naturally, their East German counterparts who have grown up
with a completely different system are still struggling to under-
stand the immensely complicated details of the new rulebook, let
alone apply them sensibly.
The necessary rebuilding of the East German economy is delayed by
a variety of hurdles to investment. In addition to remaining
ownership uncertainty, the cumbersome West German laws and regu-
lations about the appropriate planning procedures for infrastruc-
ture and housing projects contribute to the reluctance of inves-
tors. Furthermore, the insufficient provision of suitable land
and of shop and office space has turned out to be a major ob-
stacle to the establishment of new firms. Apart from ownership
disputes, this is caused by the fact that East Germany does not
yet have a normal real estate market, but only a residual market
with artificially inflated prices and rents. In a similar vein,
the housing shortage caused by the absurdly low level of the
respective rents is a major constraint on the mobility of workers
within the ex-GDR. Perversely, this may well imply that some East
German workers looking for a new job have to go West even if they
could have found a suitable job in East Germany.- 34 -
West German labour market regulations, including lay-off con-
straints, are another case in point. For instance, the rule that
existing labour contracts also hold for new owners of an enter-
prise (article 613a of the German Civil Code) renders the pur-
chase of an existing and typically overstaffed East German firm
unattractive. This rule holds even if the firm in question is
part of a larger unit which has gone bankrupt. It fosters the
tendency among Western investors to erect new plants instead of
purchasing and modernizing existing ones - or to shun East Germa-
ny altogether.
Taken together, many of the developments in East Germany are only
explicable in terms of a soft budget constraint for the whole
region. In a way, the supposed advantage that East Germany became
part of a much larger and wealthier unit, whose overall economic
situation would be only marginally affected by developments in
the East, has turned out to have some unfavourable consequences:
Politically desired decisions could be taken without proper re-
gard for their economic consequences. To a much greater extent
than would have been feasible in other Central and East European
countries, political considerations could prevail over economic
logic.
Arguably, both the amount and the type of transfers from the West
to the East may have undesirable ramifications. It remains to be
seen whether private initiative and the motivation of the people
will be impaired by the sheer size of transfers and transfer-like
credits (amounting to roughly two thirds of East German GDP in- 35 -
the second half of 1990, and, probably, in 1991 as well) . More-
over, many of the present transfers take the form of selective
subsidies for individual firms which may distort the pattern of
2
production. And, finally, the subsidization of capital through
tax credits and grants, amounting to up to 33 per cent of invest-
ment outlays (up to 42 per cent in the case of buildings), is an
inefficient way to stimulate economic recovery. It may lead to an
artificially high capital intensity of production. Instead,
public resources should be concentrated on areas which are the
true preserve of the state, i.e. improving the investment en-
vironment. Most importantly, the various bottlenecks in East
Germany's administrative and legal system and in its infra-
structure ought to be eliminated quickly. In this way, far more
private capital may be encouraged to go eastward.
VI. Lessons for Central and Eastern Europe; Summary and Policy
Conclusions
Ultimately, the success of economic transition towards a market
economy will depend on private initiatives, i.e. the readiness of
East German public sector deficits amounted to roughly DM 68
billion in the second half of 1990, DM 40 billion of which were
financed by Western transfers, the remainder by credits expli-
citly or implicitly guaranteed by the West. The respective
figure for 1991 is forecasted at roughly DM 150 billion, DM 120
billion of which will probably be covered by outright transfers
[Boss, 1990].
2
For example, subsidies for production and exports to former
CMEA countries amounted to roughly DM 6.5 billion in the second
half of 1990 [Hoffmann, 1991]. Substantial subsidies are also
granted for firms which the Treuhand deems viable in the long
run or on whose fate the Treuhand has not yet decided.- 36 -
foreign investors to commit resources to post-communist economies
and the development of domestic entrepreneurship [see also Lip-
schitz, 1990, p. 16]. In the medium run, economic liberalization
and opening up towards world markets will clearly result in
higher potential rates of return in Central and Eastern Europe so
that capital will flow east. During the transition period, how-
ever, much depends on whether short-term uncertainties about the
prospective rate of return, generating a weaker response of
foreign and domestic investors, can be contained. To succeed in
real adjustment, macroeconomic stabilization must be achieved
quickly, an efficient microeconomic incentive system must be
installed, the institutional framework has to be supportive to
individual initiative, and the absorptive capacity for private
investment has to be strengthened.
In several respects, the longer-run prospects for economic
recovery in the ex-GDR are enhanced by relatively favourable
starting conditions, as compared to other reform-minded coun-
tries. Most notably, monetary stabilization was no longer a major
problem after the GEMSU, the institutional framework was easily
available from the West, and the risk of policy reversal was
largely absent. Moreover, "the saving surplus in West Germany
provides a large pool of resources from which the investment
needs of East Germany can be financed" [McDonald and Thumann,
1990, p. 78]. At the same time, however, some of these advantages
prove to be a two-edged sword in the short run:- 37 -
(1) With monetary stabilization achieved through the currency
union, the exchange rate was no longer available as a shock ab-
sorber. A particularly strong transition crisis is by no means
surprising when, as in the case of East Germany, comprehensive
trade liberalization is accompanied with currency revaluation
[Gabrisch et al., 1990, pp. 16ff.; Hoffmann, 1991]; this is also
evident from developing country experience [Papageorgiou et al.,
1991]. Hence, a first lesson for Central and East European coun-
tries can be drawn: The East German experience should not be
misinterpreted as an argument against sweeping trade liberaliza-
tion. But governments are well advised not to stick to overvalued
exchange rates, which is frequently considered as an anti-infla-
tionary device; they should rather use the exchange rate tool to
improve international price competitiveness and, thereby, to
smoothen the transition crisis.
(2) Although easily available, the ready-made institutional in-
frastructure of West Germany may not be appropriate under ex-GDR
conditions. This refers to specific restrictive elements of this
framework which adversely affect the economy's adjustment flex-
ibility, though urgently needed especially in the difficult tran-
sition period. A case in point is the application of West German
labour market regulations, in particular lay-off constraints, in
the ex-GDR. More generally, the sophisticated legal and institu-
tional framework of advanced Western economies appears much too
complicated for economies in transition which do not possess the
administrative capacities to handle such a system efficiently.
The second lesson for Central and Eastern Europe is, thus, to- 38 -
implement only a limited set of basic rules and regulations that
are essential for the transition to a market economy, not to
interfere with the flexibility of the adjustment process, and not
to put too much strain on the public administration.
(3) Due to the "by and large satisfactory state of government
finances" [Mayer, 1990a, p. 170] in West Germany, there was ample
scope for fiscal support of economic transition and alleviation
of the social adjustment burden. However, public financial
support and subsidies may well be counterproductive. There is the
risk that the pressure for adjustment is reduced, existing econo-
mic structures are preserved, and the flexibility of labour mar-
kets is impaired. This may suggest a third lesson; To limit the
adverse effects of huge public financial transfers, Central and
Eastern Europe should attempt to attract private risk capital
imports in the first place. External public support might be
focussed on technical assistance in managing the transition pro-
cess [Kostrzewa et al., 1990]. In this way, the absorptive capa-
city of reform-minded countries for private investment may be
significantly enlarged.
The East German experience also underscores some typical transi-
tion problems that are more or less common to economies under-
taking fundamental changes in the economic regime. A major pre-
requisite to create an economic environment supportive to indi-
vidual initiative is a clear delineation of responsibilities of
the public and private sectors. In some cases, most notably the
Soviet Union, it is still to be decided to what extent individual- 39 -
property rights will be reinstated and enforced. But even after
property rights have been firmly established, uncertainty with
respect to ownership may well continue and scare away private
investors, as is presently the case in the ex-GDR. Hence, as a
fourth lesson, ownership uncertainty should be overcome as soon
as possible, e.g. by preferring financial compensation over re-
institution of previous owners of assets expropriated under the
communist rule and by accelerating the process of reinstitution
in the remaining cases.
The fifth lesson refers to the methods of privatization [for a
more detailed discussion, see Schmieding and Koop, 1991]: The
German experience suggests that an unambiguously superior
privatization approach does not exist. For example, the arguments
in favour of distributing the privatization receipts directly and
equally among the population are of less relevance in East Germa-
ny than in other Central and East European countries. In any
case, however, the institutional arrangements should ensure that
privatization proceeds without undue delay in order to strengthen
the supply response to market signals, and managers are con-
trolled effectively by shareholders. The privatization receipts
should be distributed in a way that public support is maintained
and the financial position of the government is not further
eroded. To speed up privatization, a sixth lesson should be
followed which again relates to the demarcation of responsibility
between the public and the private sector: Privatization must not
be confused with structural policy. Agencies such as the German
Treuhand do not have reliable information on the economic viabil-- 40 -
ity of the firms to be privatized. Consequently, a restrictive
stance should be applied with regard to government bridge loans
or public guarantees for new bank credit as possible restructur-
ing devices prior to privatization. Guarantees may be justified,
however, if enterprises do not have access to bank loans because
unsettled property issues result in a lack of collateral. More-
over, remaining ambiguity concerning the clean-up of environmen-
tal damages and old debt inherited from the communist era must be
removed. To overcome the reluctance of would-be investors, it
should be clearly specified in privatization contracts to what
extent old liabilities will be taken over by the government.
In addition to common transition problems, the economic trans-
formation of the ex-GDR is subject to specific constraints re-
sulting from the economic and political unification of Germany.
Obvious tensions are created by the intensively discussed trade-
off between price competitiveness, westward migration and wage
policy [see e.g. McDonald and Thumann, 1990, p. 78; Mayer,
1990b]: Wage concessions exceeding productivity gains further
erode international competitiveness, thereby discouraging private
investment and adding to unemployment in the ex-GDR. On the other
hand, wage restraint is in conflict with earlier government prom-
ises that the earnings gap between East and West Germany will
soon be narrowed. It is also said to fuel migration which, espec-
ially in the case of highly qualified employees, may adversely
affect the absorptive capacity for private investment funds. As
far as migration is concerned, however, two arguments against
excessive wage demands should be kept in mind:- 41 -
- Persistent and significant income differentials between dif-
ferent regions of West Germany suggest that it is not necessary
to eliminate the wage gap between East and West Germany in
order to stop migration [Mayer, 1990b, p. 135].
- It is open to question whether the income gap or rather additi-
onal unemployment due to wage hikes provides a stronger incen-
tive for westward migration.
The German solution to this conflict might be a more pronounced
wage differentiation with regard to skills, sectors, and regions
within East Germany. Other Central and East European countries do
not face this particular trade-off, with labour being considerab-
ly less mobile across boundaries. Nonetheless, two final conclu-
sions might be drawn from the German discussion on this issue:
Wage increases should be moderate in order to improve internati-
onal competitiveness and generate additional employment opportu-
nities in the production of tradables. This refers in particular
to countries where, similar to the ex-GDR, the wage rate has to
assume the role of the exchange rate in maintaining competitive-
ness, i.e. where the exchange rate is (mis-) used as a nominal
anchor to contain inflation. Wage demands may be checked by em-
ployers interested in the long-term viability of firms. This
indicates that market-oriented and efficient wage setting and the
privatization issue are closely intertwined, due to the observa-
tion that the management of socialist firms is more likely to
concede excessive wage increases.- 42 -
Finally, the governments bear great responsibility that wage
demands remain moderate. Experience suggests that unrealistic
forecasts and promises concerning fast economic recovery during
the transition period have fed overly optimistic public expecta-
tions on the speed by which living standards could be improved
after a change in the economic regime. The government's tempta-
tion to conceal the short-term transition costs will ultimately
add to such costs, by giving rise to additional problems in real
adjustment of firms and by undermining the government's credib-
ility in the medium term. With lack of credibility becoming a
major problem, reform programs are bound to fail and the economic
transformation of Central and Eastern Europe may be seriously
delayed.- 43
Table Al - Employment Data for East Germany. , July 1990-February 1991
July August September October November December Janu- Febru-
ary ary
Unemployment 272 361 445 537 589 642 757 787
(1000)
Short-time workers 656 1500 1729 1704 1710 1794 1856 1900
(1000)
Working-time lost per
short-time worker n.a. n.a. 43.6 44.6 47.0 ' 48.2 51.8 55
(per cent)
Vacancies 28 20 24 25 24 22 23 n.a.
(1000)
End of month. East Berlin included.
Source: Deutsches Institut fUr Wirtschaftsforschung [1991]; Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, March 7, 1991.


















































































Source: Gemeinsames Statistisches Amt der neuen Bundeslander [1990].- 44 -
Table A3 - Industrial Productiai in East Germany , October 1989 - December 1990 (1985=100)
Total Energy Chemical Metallurgy Construe- Machinery Electrical light Textiles Food












































































































































































Source: Gemeinsames Statistisches Amt der neuen Bundeslander [1990].- 45 -
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